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Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative
behavior
Valerio Capraro∗ Francesca Giardini†‡ Daniele Vilone§ Mario Paolucci‡
Abstract
Reputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation.
While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players’ past decisions,
reputations in real life are often ambiguous and opaque. Using web-based experiments, we explore the extent to which opaque
reputation works in isolating defectors, with and without partner selection opportunities. We found that low reputation works
as a signal of untrustworthiness, whereas medium or high reputations are not taken into account by subjects for orienting
their choices. Reputation without partner selection does not promote cooperative behavior; that is, defectors do not turn into
cooperators only for the sake of getting a positive reputation. Finally, in a third study, when reputation is pivotal to selection,
then a substantial proportion of would-be-defectors turn into cooperators. Taken together, these results provide insights about
the characteristics of reputation and about the way in which humans make use of it when selecting partners, and also when
knowing that they will be selected.
Keywords: reputation, partner selection, cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma, online transactions.
1 Introduction
Partner selection, that is the ability to spot and preferentially
interact with better social partners, is proposed to be a major
factor in maintaining costly cooperation between individuals
(Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). Theories on the evolution
of cooperation via indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund,
1998; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004) emphasize the role of
reputation in avoiding cheaters and supporting cooperation,
and experimental studies using dynamic networks indeed
suggest that human subjects tend to break linkswith defectors
and form new links with cooperators (Rand, Arbesman &
Christakis, 2011; Wang, Suri & Watts, 2012).
Reputation-based partner selection requires the ability to
evaluate others and to take into account third parties’ eval-
uations, i.e., the result of being evaluated by others. A
sensitivity towards others’ presence and related evaluations
is suggested by several studies. When subtle cues of be-
ing watched are present, such as a picture of watching eyes
(Bateson, Nettle & Roberts, 2005), or even three dots in
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a face-like configuration (Rigdon et al., 2009), the prob-
ability of donating something significantly increases, both
in laboratory experiments (Burnham & Hare, 2007; Haley
& Fessler, 2005) and in field studies (Ernest-Jones, Nettle
& Bateson, 2011; Yoeli et al., 2013). In economic games,
cooperation increases when subjects are informed about oth-
ers’ actions in a transparent and reliable manner, e.g., when
they receive information about the amount of other players’
past contributions in a public goods game (Sommerfeld et
al., 2007; Sommerfeld, Krambeck and Milinski, 2008), or
in a two-players donation game (d’Adda, Capraro & Tavoni,
2015; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000).
Although interesting, these studies presentwhatGranovet-
ter (1985) calls an “undersocialized” notion that equates rep-
utation with a transparent and complete history of players’
past decisions. In real life, reputations are based on per-
sonal evaluations, and they are often ambiguous, opaque and
ephemeral. Nonetheless, humans strive to acquire positive
reputations, and they select partners and make decisions on
the basis of partners’ reputations. The fragility of reputation
is even more evident if we take into account digital reputa-
tion, a widely used tool in online transactions and services.
According to Randy Farmer (2011, p. 16): “Every top web-
site is using reputation to improve its products and services,
even if only internally to mitigate abuse. In short, reputation
systems create real-world value.” Reputation systems are
designed to mediate and facilitate the process of assessing
reputations within specific communities (Dellarocas, 2011),
and they are built upon users’ evaluations (Dellarocas, 2012).
This kind of systems is pivotal to the establishment of
online transactions among distant strangers characterized by
589
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asymmetric information, in which buyers have little or no
information about the goods they are going to buy, as in
electronic markets like eBay. In these systems, comments
or feedbacks provided by previous users are essential to pro-
mote trust among parties, to overcome information asymme-
tries, and to minimize fraud (Diekman et al., 2014). How-
ever, in online reputation, evaluations are largely opaque in
many ways. Sources are unknown, as well as their metrics,
meaning that what someone rates as good can be below av-
erage for someone else, and this is especially true for ratings,
like stars. Comments can be misleading too, or, even worse,
fraudulent, because interested targets or their competitors
can artificially manipulate reviews, and thus portray a very
diﬀerent situation (Matzat & Snjders, 2012).
In spite of these problems, individuals rely heavily on
others’ reputations and evaluations, even when these are
ambiguous and non transparent, as stars in online reputa-
tion systems (such as Tripadvisor). Chevalier and Mayzlin
(2006) found that evaluations, both in the form of written re-
views and average star rankings, aﬀected book sales by two
online booksellers (and that negative and positive reviews
had asymmetric eﬀects on consumers’ behavior). Reputa-
tion systems are used in a variety of diﬀerent contexts, from
philanthropy to science (Masum&Tovey, 2011), but they are
all based on ambiguous, anonymous and usually aggregated
evaluations.
The aim of this work is to explore the extent to which
opaque reputations in the form of stars might support co-
operation in a strategic game. We consider both sides of
evaluations, introducing reputation-based partner selection
in two variants: weak and strong. Given our interest in un-
derstanding ambiguous reputations, pervasive in online en-
vironments, we choose to run web-based experiments using
the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk. To avoid
confounding factors related to online transactions (prices,
goods, sellers’ features), to measure individuals’ coopera-
tive attitudes we decide to use a standard one-shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Nowak, 2006; Perc & Szolnoki, 2010; Capraro,
2013; Rand & Nowak, 2013).
In order to single out the eﬀects of evaluations and part-
ner selection on individuals’ behaviors, we designed three
diﬀerent studies. In the first experiment, we implemented
a between-subjects design in order to understand how am-
biguous evaluations (in the form of a grade obtained in a
previous non-specified test) are taken into account, and how
subjects use such an ambiguous evaluation system when as-
sessing their partners’ behaviors. In the second and in the
third study, we investigated the eﬀect of knowing that one
will be evaluated on one’s own behavior, by increasing the
consequences of being evaluated, ranging from none to the
possibility of being selected for another round of the game
by a third-party knowing only the person’s reputation (see
Methods for more details).
Our results provide evidence of the importance of repu-
tation even when it is opaque. More specifically, we report
four major results: (i) people cooperate much less with low-
reputation partners than with medium or high reputation
partners, even if they do not know how that reputation was
acquired, (ii) when given the opportunity to select a partner
knowing only his or her reputation, people tend to select
partners with high reputation; (iii) individuals use their own
behavior as a baseline for evaluation, disregarding absolute
value of actions; (iv) knowing that they will be evaluated
by their partner and that a third party will have the opportu-
nity to select them as future partners has the eﬀect to turn a
substantial proportion of defectors into cooperators.
In sum, even when opaque and uncertain, reputation af-
fects decision making: bad reputation works as a signal of
anti-social behavior and, in combination with partner selec-
tion, promotes cooperative choices in digital environments.
2 Methods
We conducted a series of three studies recruiting subjects
through the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk
(Mason & Suri, 2014; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Rand,
2012). Here we report the experimental design of each of the
three studies. Full instructions are reported in the Appendix.
2.1 Study 1
In this study we were interested in exploring whether opaque
reputation is taken into account when interacting with some-
one, and how people apply an ambiguous reputation system
when assessing their partner’s behavior. After entering their
TurkID, subjects were randomly assigned to one of seven
conditions. In the baseline condition, subjects were ran-
domly matched to play a standard Prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
game. Specifically, each subject was given $0.10 and had to
decide whether to keep it (i.e., defect) or give it to the other
player (i.e., cooperate). In the latter case, the $0.10 would
be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other player. After
reading the instructions, subjects were asked four general
comprehension questions in random order. Subjects fail-
ing any of the comprehension questions were automatically
excluded from the survey. Those who answered all compre-
hension questions were directed to the “decision screen”, in
which they could select either “keep” or “give”, by means of
appropriate buttons.
Subjects in the low reputation condition played the same
PD game as in the baseline condition, but, before making
their choice, theywere told that the person theywerematched
with had participated in a previous test (without receiving
any information about the kind of test), in which he or she
was rated 1 out of 5 stars. This information was initially
presented in the “instructions screen” and then made salient
in the “decision screen”. In reality, there was no previous test
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and, to compute the payoﬀs, we paired subjects at random.
The neutral evaluation condition was similar to the low rep-
utation condition, with the only diﬀerence that subjects were
told that they were matched with a person who was rated 3
out of 5 stars in a previous test. In the high reputation condi-
tion subjects were told that they were matched with partners
who was rated 5 out of 5 stars in a previous test.
Subjects in the evaluated condition played the same PD
as in the baseline condition, but, before making their choice,
theywere informed that their choice would be communicated
to the other subject, who would be asked to rate it from 1 to
5 stars. This procedure was real, as cooperators were paired
with subjects in the evaluate cooperator condition below, and
defectors were paired with subjects in the evaluate defector
condition below.
In the evaluate cooperator condition subjects first played
the PD and then were informed that their partner had coop-
erated. At this stage, players were given the opportunity to
rate the other subject’s action from 1 to 5 stars. Finally, the
evaluate defector condition was similar to the evaluate coop-
erator condition, with the only diﬀerence that subjects were
required to rate the behavior of an opponent who defected.
2.2 Study 2
As it will be shown in the Results section, the average coop-
eration in the evaluated condition of Study 1 is statistically
the same as the average cooperation in the baseline condi-
tion, suggesting that the opportunity of being evaluated does
not aﬀect subjects’ choices in one-shot PD games, when the
resulting reputation has no real consequences. We designed
Study 2 in order to understand why the reputation threat had
had no eﬀect on individuals’ behaviors in Study 1. We intro-
duced a light manipulation to the setting used in the previous
study, in which we informed players that their decisions (to
cooperate or to defect) would be communicated to the other
player who could give a rating going from 1 to 5 stars. Here,
subjects were also told that ratings were collected with the
purpose of creating a rank of Turkers among which to select
players with the highest ranks for further participation in a
particularly rewarding task. To build a reputation we used
the data collected in the evaluate cooperator and evaluate
defector conditions of Study 1. Specifically, each cooper-
ator in this condition was randomly assigned to a subject
in the evaluate cooperator condition and was assigned the
evaluation given by this particular subject. Similarly with
defectors.
2.3 Study 3
As it will be shown in the Results section, the light increase
in the consequences of the evaluation experimented in Study
2 does not lead to an increase in cooperative behavior. The
aim of Study 3 is to test whether a stronger form of partner
selection would increase cooperative choices. To this end,
we employed a two-stage game in order to test for diﬀerences
in cooperation levels between the first and the second game.
After entering their TurkID, subjectswere randomly assigned
to either of two conditions. In the Random+Evaluated con-
dition, the first stage consisted of a standard PD (as in the
baseline condition in Study 1) played with a randomly se-
lected partner. The following stage, instead, was divided in
three parts: a game part, an evaluation part, and a selection
part. In the game part, subjects played another PD, neutrally
framed, with a randomly selected person, denoted Person A,
but they were told that the experimenter, in the next part of
the stage (i.e., the evaluation part), will communicate their
decision to another person, Person B (diﬀerent from Per-
son A), who was in charge of assigning subject’s behavior
a grade ranging from 1 to 5 stars. Subjects were also told
that, in the third part (i.e., the selection part), another player
(Person C) was given a list of 5 subjects (including them-
selves), each characterized by a diﬀerent grade, from which
they could choose their partner for playing a PD. Subjects
were told that, in case they were selected by Person C, they
would be playing another round of the PD with Person C.
In reality, there was no other round. So, the total payoﬀ of
a subject was given by the sum of the payoﬀs obtained in
the two PDs. Complete information about the three parts of
Stage 2 was given all together at the beginning of the stage
itself, and two comprehension questions (in addition to the
four comprehension questions asked in Stage 1) were asked
before subjects were allowed to make their decision.
The other treatment, Choose+Evaluated, was again in two
stages. In the first stage, after reading the instructions of the
PD, subjects were told that they were grouped with five other
subjects, each ofwhomwas characterized by a diﬀerent num-
ber of stars obtained in a previous unspecified test. Subjects
were asked to select the subject with whom they wanted to
play. In reality, this selection procedure was fictitious, and
subjects played with a randomly selected subject playing in
the same condition, regardless of their selection. After the
choices were made, subjects enter the second stage, which
was exactly the same as in the Choose+Evaluated condition.
3 Results
A total of 962 subjects, located in the US, passed the com-
prehension questions and participated in our three studies.
This corresponds to about 59% of the total number of sub-
jects: about 41% of subjects failed the attention check, and
were automatically excluded from the survey. This is in line
with previous studies using similar strategic situations. For
instance, Capraro, Jordan and Rand (2014) report 32% of
subjects failing a very similar attention test. To avoid multi-
ple observations from the same subject, each time we found
a subject identified with the same IP address and/or the same
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TurkID, we kept only the first decision and eliminated the
rest. As a consequence of this, the 962 subjects that we ana-
lyze are distinct in all measurable variables. Subjects failing
the comprehension questions in one study were allowed to
participate in the subsequent studies.
3.1 The eﬀect of partner’s opaque reputation
on cooperative behavior
We begin by analyzing how information about the other
person’s (opaque) reputation is taken into account when in-
teracting with them. To this end, we analyze the data of
the baseline (N = 96), the low reputation (N = 91), the neu-
tral reputation (N = 87), and the high reputation (N = 82)
conditions of Study 1. Results, summarized in Figure 1,
show that subjects cooperated much less with partners with
low reputation (one star out of five) than with the others
(Rank sum test. Low reputation vs baseline: Z = −3.41,
p = 0.0006, eﬀect size = 29%; low reputation vs neutral
reputation: Z = −3.30, p = 0.0010, eﬀect size = 29%; low
reputation vs high reputation: Z = −3.22, p = 0.0013, eﬀect
size = 28%;), even if they had no information about the way
in which this reputation was acquired. However, there is no
statistically significant diﬀerence between the rate of coop-
eration in the baseline condition and that in the “neutral”
(Rank sum test: Z = 0, p = 1) and “high” (Rank sum test:
Z = 0.05, p = 0.9601) reputation conditions. Thus, low
reputation is a signal of anti-sociality, but high reputation is
not a signal of pro-sociality.
3.2 Theuse of opaque reputation to assess oth-
ers’ behavior
Next, we analyze how subjects use opaque reputation to as-
sess their partner’s behavior. To this end, we analyze the data
of the evaluate cooperation (N = 95) and the evaluate defec-
tor (N = 93) conditions of Study 1. Results, summarized in
Figure 2, show that, when asked to assign a rate ranging from
1 to 5 stars to their partner, subjects rated cooperators over-
whelmingly higher than defectors. Specifically, the average
grade of a cooperator was 4.91, while the average rate of a
defector was 2.14 (Rank sum test: Z = 10.76, p < .0001).
Both defectors and cooperators gave cooperators very high
rates. Indeed, the average grade of a cooperator when rated
by another cooperator was 4.94, while the average grade of
a cooperator when rated by a defector was 4.86 (Rank sum
test: Z = 0.64, p = 0.5222). On the other hand, cooperators
evaluated defectors significantly worse than other defectors
did: the average grade of a defector when rated by another
defector was 2.80, while the average grade of a defector when
rated by a cooperator was 1.48 (Rank sum test: Z = 4.72,
p < .0001). The figure shows that some defectors were rated
4 or 5 stars. Data show that, in these cases, the evaluator was
herself a defector. In other words, the maximum grade given
Figure 1: Comparison among levels of cooperation when
there is no information about the partner (baseline), or when
they are ranked as having a high reputation (5 stars out of 5),
a neutral one (3 stars) or a low reputation (1 stars). Error bars
represent the standard error of themean. Only low reputation
seems to be informative for subjects, who do not cooperate
with people with low reputation, while no diﬀerences in
cooperation are found between the three other evaluations.
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to a defector by a cooperator was 3 stars. This means that
evaluations were conditional on one’s own behavior, and not
based on the absolute positive or negative value of subjects’
choices.
3.3 The eﬀect of being evaluated and external
partner selection on cooperation
Next, we analyze the eﬀect of being evaluated on cooperative
behavior in two cases: when the evaluation phase is not
followed by real partner selection; and when it is followed by
external partner selection, that is, by the possibility of being
selected by the experimenter for new studies. To this end, we
analyze the data of the evaluated condition of Study 1 (N =
95) and Study 2 (N = 96). We compare the results of Study
2 with those of the evaluated and the baseline conditions
in Study 1, although these experiments were conducted in
diﬀerent times, only to understand whether the light increase
in the consequences of the evaluation in Study 2 is likely
to produce relevant changes in cooperative behavior. Figure
3 summarizes the results and shows that neither treatments
had a significant eﬀect on cooperative behavior (Rank sum
test. Baseline vs Evaluated: Z = −0.32, p = 0.749; baseline
vs study 2: Z = −0.57, p = 0.453).
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Figure 2: Distributions of evaluations of cooperators and
defectors on a scale from 1 to 5 stars. Cooperators received
very positive evaluations, in contrast with defectors’ grades.
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3.4 The eﬀect of being evaluated and internal
partner selection on cooperation
Finally, we analyze the eﬀect of being evaluated on cooper-
ative behavior, when the evaluation is followed by internal
partner selection, that is, the possibility of being selected by
another subject for playing another round of the PD. To this
end, we analyze the data of Study 3 (Random+Evaluated:
N = 104; Choose+Evaluated: N = 123). Figures 4 and 5
show an increase of cooperation in the second PD game with
respect to the first one, in both experimental conditions. Co-
operation increased both when partners were randomly as-
signed (Random+Evaluated), and when subjects chose with
whom to interact (Choose+Evaluated), suggesting that the
opportunity of being selected as a partner in the next game
increased cooperative choices.
To understand what drives this increase in cooperative
behavior, we do a within-subject analysis looking at those
subjects who changed strategy from the first PD to the second
PD. In both experimental conditions, we find that virtually
all of those subjects who cooperated in Stage 1 remained
cooperators in Stage 2, whereas a substantial proportion
of subjects who defected in Stage 1 became cooperative in
Stage 2. Specifically, in the random+evaluated condition,
we find that 55 subjects cooperated and 49 defected in the
first PD. Among these cooperators, only 3 of them changed
strategy and defected in the second PD. On the other hand,
among the defectors, 40% of them (20 out of 49) changed
strategy and cooperated in the second PD. Similarly, in the
choose+evaluated condition, 69 subjects cooperated and 53
Figure 3: Percentage of cooperation for the evaluation with-
out partner selection condition (evaluated, Study 1) and for
the evaluation with possibility to be selected by the experi-
menter for another study (Study 2). Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean.
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defected in the first PD. Among these cooperators, none of
them changed strategy, that is, all of them cooperated also
in the next PD. Among the defectors, about 30% (16 out
of 53) changed strategy and cooperated in the second PD.
Thus, in both cases, we found that the combination of reputa-
tion and partner choice was eﬀective in turning a substantial
proportion of defectors into cooperators.
Finally, we investigated people’s preferences when they
had the opportunity to choose a partner for playing the first
PD (i.e., in the choose+evaluated condition). We find that
the majority of people, but not all (75%), preferred to play
with a partner with 5 stars. Those who decided to play
with an opponent with less than 5 stars were significantly
less cooperative than those who decided to play with an
opponent with 5 stars (average cooperation: 35% vs 63%,
Rank sum, p = 0.022).
4 Discussion
In this experimental work, we focused on the role of eval-
uations on cooperative behaviors, disentangling the eﬀects
of evaluating others from those of being evaluated, and as-
sessing the relative importance of partner selection in these
processes. The role of reputation on cooperative behav-
iors in social dilemmas is well-established (Alexander, 1987;
Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Nax, Perc,
Szolnoki & Helbing, 2015), but less is known on the con-
sequences of reputation format and presence or absence of
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Figure 4: Percentage of cooperative choices in the first and
second stage of the Random+Evaluated condition. Error
bars represent the standard error of the mean. In the sec-
ond stage, subjects played the PD knowing that their choice
would be evaluated by another person and that a third party
could select them, for playing another round of the PD, from
a list of five subjects, one for each possible grade. This
significantly increased cooperative choices, compared to the
first, completely neutral, PD.
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partner selection, especially in the noisy and ambiguous on-
line environment.
We tested whether a reputation, low, neutral or high, com-
ing from a completely unknown source and acquired in an
obscure situation (i.e., what we termed opaque reputation)
was used in a web-based experiment by subjects who had
to decide whether to cooperate or defect in a one-shot Pris-
oner Dilemma. Cooperation rates are aﬀected by partners’
rankings (expressed as one, three or five stars out of five),
but this eﬀect is not symmetrical. Subjects rated with one
star received significantly less cooperation than subjects with
neutral (three stars) and high (five stars) reputations.
The preminence of bad evaluations over good ones is a
distinguishing trait of human psychology (Baumeister et al.,
2001), and it seems especially salient in social contexts.
Anderson and colleagues (2011) show that negative gossip
associatedwith neutral faces dominates longer in a visual dis-
crimination task. In the online world, Chevalier andMayzlin
(2006) find that a negative review of a book has a stronger
influence than a positive one, in online book sellers websites
like Amazon. Our results are thus in line with previous find-
ings. But they could also be due to the fact that there was less
room for increases on the positive side of neutral, if some
subjects were inclined not cooperate regardless of who their
partner was.
In the second study, subjects were told that their actions
would have been evaluated using the same opaque reputation
system used in the first study, but our results showed that
evaluation alone, without any actual partner selection, was
not eﬀective in increasing cooperative choices. Informing
Figure 5: Percentage of cooperative choices in the first and
second stage of the Choose+Evaluated condition. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean. Even when choos-
ing a partner, subjects did not show increases in cooperation
until the second game, when they were evaluated and, pos-
sibly, selected for another game.
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subjects that their partners had the opportunity to rate them
did not make cooperation increase with respect to a baseline,
not even when we told them that a general ranking of players
with the possibility of participating in future rewarding tasks
would be created. This result allows us to narrow down
the eﬀect of partner selection, while stressing the fact that
cooperation is not enhanced by the simple awareness that
someone evaluates us.
In order to understand better how and under which condi-
tions partner selection is eﬀective in promoting cooperation,
we design a third study using a repeated game in which
subjects were told that partner selection was real. Our re-
sults show an increase in cooperation levels between the
first game (without evaluation and partner selection) and the
second one, in which players were told that their behavior
would have been evaluated and this evaluation transmitted
to another potential player. The increase in cooperation was
not due to “active partner choice”, because it happened also
when partners were randomly assigned, therefore leading us
to conclude that the combination of being evaluated and be-
ing selected explained the observed increase in cooperation.
In the third experiment, we also observed that a subset of
subjects selected partners with less than five stars and did
not cooperate with them.
Although centered on digital reputation, our work adds to
the literature on reputation systems but also to the general
literature on cooperation. Studies on web-based reputation
systems usually analyze real websites designed for enhancing
trust in online transactions, in which real goods or services
are exchanged (Dellarocas, 2006; Farmer and Glass, 2010).
Our studies use a completely neutral setting, in which mo-
tivations related to individual preferences or needs do not
enter decision making, but the main elements of reputation
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systems, i.e., evaluations and partner selection, are present.
Showing that an opaque negative reputation can support co-
operation complements evolutionary accounts that consider
negative reputation as a powerful means for detecting and
avoiding cheaters (Barkow, 1992; Giardini & Conte, 2012;
Hess & Hagen, 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998), a view
supported also by several experimental findings (Anderson
et al., 2011; Feinberg et al, 2012; Sommerfeld et al., 2008).
Reputation alone, however, seems to have no eﬀect when it
is devoid of partner choice, showing that what is called the
“threat of gossip” (Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011; Piazza &
Bering, 2008) is eﬀective only when consequences of repu-
tation are evident.
Reputation plays amajor role in human sociality, and it has
been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of costly
cooperation. In recent years, reputation has become central
also in online systems, even if it is much less controllable
and completely opaque. Our findings suggest that reputation,
even if opaque, works in isolating defectors, but its value is
conditional on subjects’ behaviors. Moreover, when partner
selection is not eﬀective, individuals do not become more
cooperative only for the sake of getting a positive reputation,
at least not in an anonymous online environment. Only when
reputation is pivotal to selection does it leads individuals to
change their behaviors and to cooperate. The behavioral
switch is strong: the mere possibility of being selected for a
new interaction turn about 35%of defectors into cooperators.
This finding is interesting since it suggests yet another way
to promote cooperative behavior in the field (see Kraft-Todd
et al., 2015, for a recent review on interventions to promote
cooperation in the field).
More generally, our experiments provide insights on the
way in which humans use reputational information in un-
certain environments such as online interactions. This has
implications that exceed online markets and can be applied
to several domains. For example, companies or universities,
whose success is highly based on cooperation among their
employees, might develop a reputational system, according
to which colleagues that have been working together on the
same project can rate one another.
Our experiments certainly have some limitations. Study 1
uses deception in three out of seven conditions; specifically,
those in which subjects are told that their partners obtained a
certain grade in a previous unspecified test. In reality there
was no previous test. Study 3 uses deception when subjects
are told that they could be selected for another round of the
PD, depending on how their choice would be evaluated by a
third party. In reality, although the evaluation procedure was
real, there was no selection for other rounds. In general, the
use of deceptive messages leads to a decrease of the eﬀect
size (when there is a true eﬀect), driven by a proportion of
subjects that may anticipate the fact that the manipulation is
not real. Thus, the eﬀect sizes that we found in Study 1 and
Study 3 are likely to be a lower bound for the true eﬀect sizes.
Understanding the true sizes of these eﬀects is a direction for
future work. It is even possible that the asymmetric eﬀect
of reputation information on cooperative behavior (Study
1) is an artifact of the use of deceptive messages: subjects
paired with high reputation partners may be more skeptical
about the reality of the manipulation than those paired with
low reputation partners. Although, as discussed above, this
asymmetry is in linewith previous studies, we cannot exclude
that, in our case, it is driven by the use of deception and thus
we leave this question for further research.
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Appendix: Experimental instructions
Each study started with the same two screens. In the first
screen we asked subjects to type their WorkID, while in the
second screen we informed them about the average length of
the study, the corresponding participation fee, and the fact
that there would be comprehension questions. They were
also informed that they would be automatically excluded
from the survey in case they fail any of them. At the end
of this screen, subjects could either continue and play, or
end the survey. After each treatment, standard demographic
questions were asked, at the end of which subjects were given
the completion code needed to claim for the payment. We
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report below full instructions of each study.
Study 1
In Study 1, subjects were randomly assigned to play one
of six conditions (Baseline, Low reputation, Neutral repu-
tation, High reputation, Evaluate cooperator, and Evaluate
defector). Instructions of these conditions were as follows
(we report the comprehension questions only in the Baseline
condition, but they were present in each condition).
Baseline
You have been paired with another, anonymous participant.
How much money you earn depends on your own choice,
and on the choice of the other participant.
You are given 10 additional cents. You can either keep
the money or give it to the other participant. If you decide to
give the money, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned
by the other participant.
The other participant will be given the same choice.
So:
• if you both give, you both get 20 cents
• if you both keep, you both get 10 cents
• if you give and the other person keeps, then you earn
nothing
• if you keep and the other participant gives, then you get
30 cents.
The other person is REAL and will really make a decision.
Once you have each made your decision, neither of you will
ever be able to aﬀect each others’ bonuses in later parts of
the HIT.
Now we will ask you several questions to make sure that
you understand how the payoﬀs are determined.
YOU MUST ANSWER ALL THESE QUESTIONS
CORRECTLY TO RECEIVE A BONUS!
Which action by YOU gives YOU a higher bonus?
• Keep
• Give
Which action by YOU gives the OTHER PLAYER a higher
bonus?
• Keep
• Give
Which action by the OTHER PLAYER gives the OTHER
PLAYER a higher bonus?
• Keep
• Give
Which action by the OTHER PLAYER gives YOU a
higher bonus?
• Keep
• Give
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension ques-
tions. It is now time to make a decision.
WHAT IS YOUR CHOICE?
• Keep
• Give
Low reputation
You have been paired with another participant.
The other participant is not completely anonymous. In a
previous study, he or she participated in a test. We will tell
you how he or she was rated in this test later.
You are now paired with this person and you both have to
make a choice. How much money you earn depends on your
own choice, and on the choice of the other participant.
You are given 10 additional cents. You can either keep
the money or give it to the other participant. If you decide to
give the money, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned
by the other participant.
The other participant will be given the same choice.
So:
• if you both give, you both get 20 cents
• if you both keep, you both get 10 cents
• if you give and the other person keeps, then you earn
nothing
• if you keep and the other participant gives, then you get
30 cents.
The other person is REAL and will really make a decision.
Once you have each made your decision, neither of you will
ever be able to aﬀect each others’ bonuses in later parts of
the HIT.
(Comprehension questions were asked here)
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension ques-
tions. It is now time to make a decision.
YOU HAVE BEEN PAIRED WITH A PARTICIPANT
RATED 1 STAR OUT OF A MAXIMUM OF 5.
What is your choice?
• Keep
• Give
Neutral reputation
This condition was identical to the Low reputation con-
dition, with an important diﬀerence: the sentence ‘YOU
HAVE BEEN PAIRED WITH A PARTICIPANT RATED 3
STARS OUT OF AMAXIMUMOF 5’ was replaced by this
sentence ‘YOU HAVE BEEN PAIRED WITH A PARTICI-
PANT RATED 3 STARS OUT OF AMAXIMUMOF 5’, in
order to manipulate the partner’s reputation.
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High reputation
This condition was identical to the Low reputation condition,
but the partner had a very positive reputation, as expressed
in the following sentence: ‘YOU HAVE BEEN PAIRED
WITH A PARTICIPANT RATED 5 STARS OUT OF A
MAXIMUM OF 5’.
Evaluate cooperator
You have been paired with another, anonymous participant.
How much money you earn depends on your own choice,
and on the choice of the other participant.
You are given 10 additional cents. You can either keep
the money or give it to the other participant. If you decide to
give the money, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned
by the other participant.
The other participant will be given the same choice.
So:
• if you both give, you both get 20 cents
• if you both keep, you both get 10 cents
• if you give and the other person keeps, then you earn
nothing
• if you keep and the other participant gives, then you get
30 cents.
The other person is REAL and will really make a decision.
Once you have each made your decision, neither of you will
ever be able to aﬀect each others’ bonuses in later parts of
the HIT.
(Comprehension questions were asked here)
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension ques-
tions. It is now time to make a decision.
WHAT IS YOUR CHOICE?
• Keep
• Give
The other participant decided to GIVE. Please rate his or
her behavior.
• 1 star
• 2 stars
• 3 stars
• 4 stars
• 5 stars
Evaluate defector
This condition was identical to the EvaluateC condition, ex-
cept for the fact that the partner decided to keep, therefore
the word ‘GIVE’ in the last screen was replaced by ‘KEEP’.
Study 2
In Study 2 participants were randomly selected to participate
in either of two conditions: weak priming and strong prim-
ing. Below we report exact instructions of the treatment.
Comprehension questions were exactly the same as in Study
1, so we do not report them again.
Weak priming
You have been paired with another, anonymous participant.
How much money you earn depends on your own choice,
and on the choice of the other participant.
IMPORTANT: AFTER YOU MAKE YOUR CHOICE,
WE WILL COMMUNICATE IT TO THE OTHER PAR-
TICIPANT,WHOWILLBEGIVENTHEOPPORTUNITY
TO RATE YOUR BEHAVIOUR GIVING 1 TO 5 STARS.
You are given 10 additional cents. You can either keep
the money or give it to the other participant. If you decide to
give the money, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned
by the other participant.
The other participant will be given the same choice.
So:
• if you both give, you both get 20 cents
• if you both keep, you both get 10 cents
• if you give and the other person keeps, then you earn
nothing
• if you keep and the other participant gives, then you get
30 cents.
The other person is REAL and will really make a decision.
Once you have each made your decision, neither of you will
ever be able to aﬀect each others’ bonuses in later parts of
the HIT.
(Comprehension questions were asked here)
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension ques-
tions. It is now time to make a decision.
REMEMBER THAT, AFTER THE CHOICES ARE
MADE, THE OTHER PARTICIPANT WILL BE GIVEN
THE OPPORTUNITY TO RATE YOUR BEHAVIOUR.
What is your choice?
• Keep
• Give
Strong priming
You have been paired with another, anonymous partic-
ipant. How much money you earn depends on your own
choice, and on the choice of the other participant.
You are given 10 additional cents. You can either keep
the money or give it to the other participant. If you decide to
give the money, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned
by the other participant.
The other participant will be given the same choice.
So:
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• if you both give, you both get 20 cents
• if you both keep, you both get 10 cents
• if you give and the other person keeps, then you earn
nothing
• if you keep and the other participant gives, then you get
30 cents.
The other person is REAL and will really make a decision.
Once you have each made your decision, neither of you will
ever be able to aﬀect each others’ bonuses in later parts of
the HIT.
(Comprehension questions were asked here)
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension ques-
tions.
BEFORE YOU MAKE A DECISION, WE INFORM
YOU THAT WE ARE DEFINING A RATING SYS-
TEM FOR PARTICIPANTS. YOUR BEHAVIOR WILL
BE RATED BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS (FROM 1 TO 5
STARS) AND THIS INFORMATION WILL BE STORED
INOURDATABASEANDUSED FOR SELECTING PAR-
TICIPANTS IN FURTHER TASKS.
What is you choice?
• Keep
• Give
Study 3
In Study 3, subjects were randomly assigned to either of
two conditions: Random+Evaluated and Choose+evaluated.
Full instructions are reported below. Comprehension ques-
tions about the Prisoner’s Dilemma were exactly the same as
in the previous studies and so we do not report them again.
Random+Evaluated
This HIT is divided in two stages.
In this first stage, you are given 10 additional cents. You
can either keep it or give it to the other participant. If you
decide to give it, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned
by the other participant.
The other participant will be given the same choice.
So:
• if you both give, you both get 20 cents
• if you both keep, you both get 10 cents
• if you give and the other person keeps, then you earn
nothing
• if you keep and the other participant gives, then you get
30 cents.
The other participant is REAL and will really make a choice.
This is a one-shot interaction. In the second stage of this HIT
you will be grouped with other participants. The current
participant will not have the possibility to influence your
bonus in later parts of the HIT.
(Comprehension questions were asked here)
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension ques-
tions.
It is now time to make a choice. What do you want to do?
• Keep
• Give
The second stage of this HIT consists of three parts:
PART 1
Here you will play the same game as in the first stage, with
a random participant. You know nothing about him or her.
Recall, briefly, the rules of the game: You are given 10
additional cents. You can either keep it or give it to the
other participant. If you decide to give it, your 10c will be
multiplied by 2 and earned by the other participant. The
other participant is given the same choice.
PART 2
Here we will communicate your choice to another
participant, Person B (diﬀerent from Person A). The role of
Person B is to rate your choice by giving it a score ranging
from 1 to 5 stars.
PART 3
Here we will show to another participant, Person C (diﬀer-
ent from Persons A and B) the number of stars you received
from Person B. Person C will choose with whom to play
from a list of 5 participants, including you, each one char-
acterized by a score. If Person C chooses to play with you,
you will play again and you will have the opportunity to win
more money. Otherwise, if Person C chooses to play with
someone else, your HIT will end.
Nowwewill ask you two simple comprehension questions
in order to make sure you understood the procedure. Recall
that you must answer these questions correctly in order to
get a bonus.
What happens in Part 2?
• I will play the same game again
• The choice I made in Part 1 will be communicated to a
third-party, who will rate it
• The choice I made in Part 1 will be communicated to
the same person with whom I played in Part 1, who will
rate it
• The choice I made in Part 1 will be communicated to
the same person with whom I played in Part 1, after
which he or she makes his or her choice.
What happens in Part 3?
• I will play the same game again
• I will play the same game with a person who knows the
choice I made in Part 1
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• I will play the same game with a person who knows
how the choice I made in Part 1 was rated in Part 2
• I will be grouped with a person who knows how my
choice was rated and decides whether to play with me
or not.
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension questions.
What is your choice?
• Keep
• Give
Choose+evaluated
This HIT is divided in two stages.
In this first stage, you are given 10 additional cents. You
can either keep it or give it to the other participant. If you
decide to give it, your 10c will be multiplied by 2 and earned
by the other participant.
The other participant will be given the same choice.
So:
• if you both give, you both get 20 cents
• if you both keep, you both get 10 cents
• if you give and the other person keeps, then you earn
nothing
• if you keep and the other participant gives, then you get
30 cents.
The other participant is REAL and will really make a choice.
This is a one-shot interaction. In the second stage of this HIT
you will be grouped with other participants. The current
participant will not have the possibility to influence your
bonus in later parts of the HIT.
(Comprehension questions were asked here)
Congratulations! You passed all comprehension ques-
tions.
You have been grouped together with other five partici-
pants. In a previous HIT, these people participated in a test.
They rated as follows:
• Person A’s grade is 1 starout of a maximum of 5
• Person B’s grade is 2starsout of a maximum of 5
• Person C’s grade is 3starsout of a maximum of 5
• Person D’s grade is 4starsout of a maximum of 5
• Person E’s grade is 5starsout of a maximum of 5
Please choose the participant you would like to play with:
• Person A (grade: 1 star out of a maximum of 5)
• Person B (grade: 2 stars out of a maximum of 5)
• Person C (grade: 3 stars out of a maximum of 5)
• Person D (grade: 4 stars out of a maximum of 5)
• Person E (grade: 5 stars out of a maximum of 5)
It is now time to make a choice. What do you want to do?
• Keep
• Give
(The second stage of this condition was identical to the sec-
ond stage of the ‘Random+Evaluated’ condition)
